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Abstract
The financial turmoil, which began in the summer of 2007, has developed into one of the most disrup-
tive financial and economic crisis experienced by the world in many decades. At the root of the crisis
we find a combination of macroeconomic imbalances and microeconomic factors, including market
failures and deficiencies in the design of regulatory and supervisory frameworks. This article analyses
the underlying causes which contributed to the crisis and reviews the key measures adopted by public
authorities to mitigate its effects as well as some of the lessons learned to make the international finan-
cial markets more resilient.
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1. Introduction
The financial turmoil, which began in the summer of 2007, has developed into one of
the most disruptive financial and economic crises experienced by the world in many decades.
At the root of the crisis we find a combination of macroeconomic imbalances and microeco-
nomic factors, including market failures and deficiencies in the design of regulatory and su-
pervisory frameworks. This article analyses the underlying causes which contributed to the
crises, and reviews the key measures adopted by public authorities to mitigate its effects as
well as some of the lessons learned to make the international financial markets more re-
silient.
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from two anonymous referees are kindly appreciated. The paper is structured in four sections. Section 2 is devoted to analysing the under-
lying causes that have contributed to the crisis. The following section, broadly describes
the policy responses given by the major players in the global economy from four different
angles: liquidity policy, monetary policy, fiscal policy and regulatory reform. Section 4
discusses in depth the actions undertaken by central banks –with special focus on the poli-
cies deployed by the ECB and the Eurosystem– and their rationale, as well as some of the
challenges ahead. Finally, section 5 sketches the potential new environment for policy-
makers, and in particular for central banks, that may become a key legacy of the current
crisis.
2. Market failures in the financial system
2.1. Key developments of the crisis
The start of the financial crisis was triggered in the summer of 2007 with the increasing
realisation that the risks associated with the US sub-prime mortgage market were not prop-
erly reflected in the price of related instruments, particularly mortgage-backed securities. A
market-wide reassessment of financial risk led to sharp increases in premia and spreads
across all segments of the credit market. Rapidly falling market valuations of credit instru-
ments affected the net worth and profitability of the banking systems worldwide.
Tensions in the markets for credit instruments spread to the money markets in early Au-
gust 2007, giving rise to concerns about systemic disruptions. Interbank trading came almost
to a halt on 9 August as a result of the combination of: i) exceptionally high uncertainty
about potential direct exposures of banks to “toxic” assets; and ii) increased demand for liq-
uidity to honour credit lines committed to so-called conduits (i.e. bank-sponsored off-bal-
ance sheet investment vehicles).
In particular, lack of transparency about the extent of exposures prevented market par-
ticipants from distinguishing good banks from bad banks, leading to a decline in trading as
predicted by Akerlof (1970) in his “lemon market” paper on the role of asymmetric informa-
tion in markets. In addition, as a result of great uncertainty about asset valuations, the out-
break of the turmoil led to disruptions in the issuance of short-term paper, such as asset-
backed commercial paper, on which many banks had become increasingly reliant over time
for the funding of their securitisation activities. Against this background, money market in-
terest rates and spreads rose sharply, while liquidity dried up, prompting central banks to in-
tervene through large-scale liquidity injections (see figure 1 and 2)1.
As the year 2007 went on, the fall in US housing prices accelerated against the backdrop
of the rising number of foreclosures and the slowdown of the domestic economy. This led to
an increase in the number of defaults in mortgages, not only for sub-prime mortgages but
also for the prime segment of the markets. An increasing number of securities linked to mort-
gages turned out to be much riskier than previously thought.
128 JOSÉ MANUEL GONZÁLEZ-PÁRAMOAll  major  central  banks  around  the  globe  continued  to  address  market  disruptions
through significant liquidity injections. However, the losses in several important markets for
financial assets continued to mount and in March 2008, the Federal Reserve Bank had to en-
gineer the rescue of Bear Stearns, then the fifth largest US investment bank, together with
JP Morgan. In addition, it granted direct access to central bank financing to the other main
investment banks for the first time since the Great Depression.
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Figure 1. EURIBOR rates (percentage points)
Source: Reuters.
Figure 2. Spreads between EURIBOR rates and overnight interest swaps (basis points)
Source: Reuters.The financial turmoil deepened in the weeks following the collapse of the Lehman
Brothers in mid-September 2008, eventually developing into a full-blown crisis with adverse
spillovers  into  real  activity.  Within  two  weeks  of  the  bankruptcy  of  Lehman  Brothers,
mounting losses from the sub-prime mortgage markets led to both the country’s largest in-
surance company (AIG) and largest savings and loan institution (Washington Mutual) being
seized by the government. Widespread concerns about the solvency of financial institutions
ensued and spread to Europe, where government assistance was needed to avert the collapse
of several institutions.
2.2. Underlying causes
In order to understand the causes of the crisis, it is important to distinguish between the
macroeconomic factors and those of a microeconomic nature. As for the macroeconomic
factors, the roots of the current crisis may go as far back as the late 1990s, when global im-
balances in current account positions and capital flows across major economies, particular-
ly in the United States, started to build up. At the time, several emerging economies en-
hanced fiscal discipline, while experiencing a collapse in investment, which contributed,
alongside other factors, to substantial surpluses in savings investment and current account
balances. In the industrialised countries, corporate investment fell after the collapse of the IT
bubble in 2001. Meanwhile, in the United States, private saving fell, while domestic demand
continued to expand. Excess savings in the world outside the United States –the so-called
“savings glut”–  together with accommodative global monetary conditions led to ample liq-
uidity in the world financial markets and low interest rates across the maturity spectrum.
Turning to the micro factors, financial innovation allowed the repackaging of mortgages
—traditionally, illiquid assets originated and held by local banks— into higher-yielding
complex securities with triple-A ratings. Mortgage-backed securities or more complex prod-
ucts based on those securities were in high demand from banks and investors around the
world seeking more profitable investment opportunities (the so-called “search for yield”) in
a financial environment characterised by low interest rates. The situation endured as long as
the sustained appetite of foreign investors for debt securities issued by the US government
and government-sponsored agencies as well as by the corporate sector allowed the US to
smoothly finance its current account deficit.
More generally, the “search for yield” fostered the demand for more complex forms of
securitisation, which led to the creation of instruments entailing risks that were difficult to
assess and price. No active secondary market existed for many of the new instruments, and
the associated “opacity” of the credit risk distribution made it difficult to keep track of the
exposures.
It is often questioned why investors did not look more closely into the risks associated
with  the  securities  purchased,  thereby  playing  a  disciplinary  role  in  the  securitisation
process. The answer is likely to be related to the existence of “agency problems” associated
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model –that became prevalent among large banks over the past twenty years– was designed
to deliver a more efficient allocation and distribution of risks in the economy.
However, because of information asymmetries and frictions, the “originate and distrib-
ute” model in practice gave rise to inefficient outcomes and distorted the behaviour of the
various parties involved in the securitisation process: investors, rating agencies, intermedi-
aries, and originators3. The main reason for such information asymmetries and frictions is
that the goals of the various categories of agents involved tended to differ, and in some in-
stances may have been in conflict. Besides, the different categories did not fully internalise
the consequences of their individual actions in the overall process, and therefore did not have
the right incentives to share information efficiently.
In particular, investors became over-reliant on the ratings provided by rating agencies
and often did not properly conduct their due diligence. The fact that regulators gave ratings
a prominent role in the risk assessment framework might have indirectly affected investors’
incentives. Indeed, investors often ignored the fact that rating agencies’ risk measures offer
only a partial account of the risks embedded in the securities, as they focus primarily on the
expected loss and do not take into account the tail of the loss distribution. In addition, they
consider only some of the sources of risks and, in particular, do not take liquidity risks into
account.
Moreover, rating agencies were themselves subject to potential conflicts of interest that
may have diminished their incentives to undertake timely downgrades of structured products
and provide adequate information to investors regarding the analysis underlying the rating
decision. In fact, because ratings are paid for by issuers, rating agencies may have incentives
to expand coverage to products whose risk assessment is difficult and, potentially unreliable,
in order to maximise their revenues. Besides, agencies may also provide commercial advice
and consultancy services to the issuers of those securities that are themselves requested to
rate.
As regards originators of loans, their incentives to screen and monitor borrowers may
have been reduced under the “originate and distribute” model, since this model allows them
to dispose of the originated assets to intermediaries that subsequently take care of repackag-
ing them into securities. Instead, the loan originators may have concentrated on expanding
volumes of loans originated in order to boost their profits. The diminished incentive to
screen and monitor borrowers for loan originators implies that investors may have ultimate-
ly acquired assets of relatively lower quality and performance. Besides, the intermediaries
that purchased assets and bundled them into pools before securitising them are likely to have
focused on maximising revenues stemming from the servicing fees charged to investors,
without necessarily delivering the risk/return balance desired by investors.
More generally, remuneration schemes based on rewarding short-term profits tended to
predominate throughout the financial system, often to the detriment of the longer-term health
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level are based on the comparison of the latest results vis-à-vis those of their peers and thus
tend to encourage short-termism and risk-taking by managers keen on avoiding underperfor-
mance. The pressure to deliver quick profits makes it more difficult for risk management de-
partments to curb excessive risk-taking at their financial institutions. The job of risk man-
agers is also complicated by the fact that certain risks are hard to quantify and measure (for
example, tail risks) and that commonly agreed valuation models are missing for more com-
plex securities.
The focus on short-term profits magnified the more general “pro-cyclical” tendencies of
financial systems, which are also induced by a host of both institutional and economic fac-
tors, such as accounting standards (e.g. mark-to-market accounting) and the dependence of
collateral values and leverage ratios on asset prices.
These structural incentive problems may not have been taken fully into account in the
design of regulatory and supervisory frameworks. The Basel I framework prevalent at the
time of the turmoil’s outbreak underestimated banks’ exposures by not capturing the bulk of
risks related to off-balance sheet vehicles as well as liquidity and reputational risks. 
In addition, the ability of authorities to enforce the regulatory and supervisory frame-
works  was  weakened  by  regulatory  arbitrage.  For  instance,  some  financial  innovation
processes were triggered –among other considerations– in order to circumvent the existing
regulation, particularly on capital requirements. The challenges stemming from regulatory
arbitrage have become acute in the current environment characterised by large and complex
financial institutions operating across borders, under different national regulatory and super-
visory regimes. 
To sum up, the causes of the current crisis can be traced back to macroeconomic imbal-
ances and, at the microeconomic level, to incentive problems, with regulatory and supervi-
sory deficiencies having also played a role. Nonetheless, the current crisis has shown the im-
portance of system-wide externalities in propagating and exacerbating the crisis4. Problems
of individual banks may have wide and serious implications for both the financial system it-
self and the economy as a whole. Overall, banks must ultimately respond to losses on risky
assets by raising new capital. New equity, however, may be difficult to be issued in suffi-
cient amounts in the short run. As a consequence, banks’ first responses have been both asset
“fire sales” and the scaling back of their lending activity.
Widespread  liquidation  of  assets  in  the  current  market  conditions  pushes  prices
down. Through mark-to-market accounting, declining asset prices lead to unwarranted
contagion to other banks with similar assets. Those banks may be forced to adjust their
positions by selling assets themselves, thus leading to further asset price declines. Simi-
larly, when deciding to cut lending, banks may not internalise the impact of their deci-
sions on the real economy in terms of foregone profitable investment opportunities, out-
put and employment.
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3.1. Liquidity policies
Central banks have represented the first line of policy defence against the adverse dy-
namics set in motion by the financial crisis, particularly through the massive provision of liq-
uidity. Although the specific responses have varied across central banks5, these institutions
pursued the common objective of addressing the global liquidity squeeze, particularly in
order to mitigate the risk that protracted liquidity shortages turn into solvency problems.
Central bank liquidity provision has not been limited to the shortest end of the money
market rates, but has, in some cases, also sought to ease pressures at term maturities through
an increased supply of longer-term funds. Access to central bank funding has also been fa-
cilitated by enlarging the list of collateral eligible for the central bank lending operations and
by widening the range of counterparties with access to these operations. In some countries,
central banks have also extended lending to non-depositary banks and to non-bank financial
institutions. Additionally, some central banks have established securities lending facilities to
improve the functioning of their interbank repo markets. Finally, in a limited number of
cases, central banks have assisted their domestic governments in providing emergency liq-
uidity assistance to institutions under stress.
An important characteristic of the global policy response to the financial crisis has been
the  strengthened  cooperation  among  central  banks.  Cooperation  has  taken  place,  first,
through enhanced information- sharing and collective monitoring of market developments,
and later on by taking coordinated steps to ease liquidity tensions in the global money mar-
kets. The first initiative in this direction was the agreement in December 2007 between the
ECB and the US Federal Reserve to grant loans in US dollars to euro area counterparties in
connection with the Fed’s Term Auction Facility (TAF). The US dollar-denominated loans
to euro area banks were financed through a currency arrangement (swap line) between the
two central banks.
The US dollar liquidity-providing bilateral agreements between the Fed and the ECB (as
well as between the Fed and a growing number of central banks6) under the TAF programme
has been significantly expanded over time in terms of scale. In addition, the Eurosystem has
signed agreements with the Fed and the central banks of several European countries in order
to improve the provision of euro liquidity to their banking sectors. 
3.2. Monetary and fiscal policies
From the start of the crisis the major central banks around the world have also adjusted
their respective monetary policy stances to reflect the diminished risks for price stability, al-
beit at different paces (reflecting differences in domestic macroeconomic conditions and
specific monetary policy objectives). By doing so, these institutions have intended to anchor
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nancial crisis.
On the fiscal side, governments around the world have announced a number of initia-
tives in order to tackle the effects of the financial crisis. The nature of the fiscal measures
has evolved with the development of the financial crisis and its propagation to the real econ-
omy.
Government interventions initially focused on addressing problems at single institu-
tions, mainly through rescues and provisions of guarantees. Some governments also an-
nounced measures to provide relief to struggling homeowners, and attempted to stimulate
domestic economies, particularly in those countries where the slowdown in housing markets
was more significant. 
As the financial turmoil intensified and the need to support the entire financial system
became clearer, the fiscal response in Europe and in the United States evolved into more
comprehensive plans designed to support entire domestic financial industries rather than in-
dividual institutions. Such plans typically comprised capital injections in exchange for equi-
ty and the more systematic provision of state guarantees on bank liabilities. Some countries
also set up asset support schemes aiming to either (1) help banks to transfer troubled assets
to separate institutions or (2) provide insurance on assets retained by the banks on their bal-
ance sheets. Finally, stimulus packages aimed at fostering aggregate demand have also been
announced, as the adverse effects of the crisis have worked through to the real economy.
In parallel with the increase in the scope of fiscal measures, there has also been a rise in
the degree of international policy coordination, reflecting the global nature and amplitude of
the current crisis. The G7 and G20 summits have represented major steps for policy coordi-
nation at the global level, while at the EU level international cooperation has been shaped by
the exceptional procedures from the European Commission to coordinate and accelerate na-
tional rescue plans, as well as by the European Economic Recovery Plan. This plan provides
a common framework for the efforts made by Member States and by the EU, with a view to
ensuring consistency and maximising their effectiveness, in accordance with and within the
framework of the Stability and Growth Pact.
In addition, other types of fiscal measures are currently at work. As the economic crisis
has deepened, a significant contribution to the fiscal adjustment has come from the so-called
automatic stabilisers. These are programmes linked to social security and unemployment
benefits, which are generally more comprehensive in Europe than in the United States. As
they act immediately and are proportionate to the depth of the business cycle, automatic sta-
bilisers can be more timely and targeted than discretionary policies, and do not suffer from
political economy risks that can undermine the effectiveness of the discretionary measures.
The volume of public resources made available or committed by governments is very
substantial. For instance, the IMF estimates that in 2009 the additional fiscal stimulus in the
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much as 3.6% of GDP (IMF, 2009). In this context, it should be noted that sustainability of
the public finances is a pre-condition for the effectiveness of the extraordinary measures.
Some of the fiscal stimulus packages that have been adopted recently in Europe have raised
some concerns, as some of them have been adopted in countries where the fiscal situation al-
ready calls for particular prudence regarding its sustainability. In particular, in countries
where the presence of automatic stabilisers is significantly important, governments should
take the prospective burden of non-discretionary measures into account when designing their
fiscal plans.
3.3. Regulatory reforms
With regard to regulatory reforms, the competent authorities at both the European and
the global level have been actively involved in the development of measures aimed at restor-
ing market confidence and enhancing the stability of the financial system.
At the European level, policy action has been guided by the ECOFIN Roadmap which
identified four priority areas: i) enhancing transparency, ii) improving valuation standards,
iii) reinforcing prudential rules and risk management, and iv) improving market functioning.
These priorities have been mirrored at the international level by the Financial Stability
Forum (now Financial Stability Board) in its proposal of April 2008 (consisting of a set of
67 recommendations), subsequently endorsed by the G7 ministers and central bank gover-
nors. To recall, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) brings together central banks, banking
supervisors and finance ministries from the largest economies. The Forum also involves in-
ternational institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements. In recognition of the global dimension of the current financial crisis, the
G20 Finance Ministers and central bank governors acknowledged in their November meet-
ing last year the need to expand the FSB’s membership to also include key emerging market
economies. This is expected to contribute to further enhancing the forum’s ability to coordi-
nate global efforts towards a more resilient financial system.
4. What did central banks do? Why did they do it?
Central banks have acted on three different fronts to tackle the crisis, namely liquidity
management, monetary policy and measures to preserve financial stability. As a starting
point, it is useful to recall that the ECB’s interventions on money markets have been histor-
ically based on the fundamental principle of the separation between monetary policy deci-
sions and their implementation. Thus, under normal conditions, monetary policy decisions
are conceptually different from the liquidity measures undertaken to implement them. How-
ever, as it will be discussed below, under non-conventional monetary policy, the distinction
can become blurred.
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4.1.1. Addressing liquidity risk through increased intermediation
From the start of the turmoil until the collapse of Lehman Brothers in mid-September
2008, the ECB engaged in active liquidity management by adjusting the temporal and quan-
titative distribution of its liquidity provision within the maintenance period7. Besides, from
October 2007, the Eurosystem has engaged in increasing international cooperation to ease
tensions in global money markets, particularly by facilitating the access of euro area banks
to US dollar liquidity.
Through the adjustments to its euro operations, the ECB responded to the perceived
change in the pattern of banks’ demand for liquidity over the maintenance period, in partic-
ular responding to the increasing evidence that interest rates were no longer necessarily
linked to liquidity conditions on the last day of the maintenance period (as postulated by the
so-called “martingale hypothesis”). Indeed, unlike in normal times8, banks seemed to no
longer regard reserve holdings on different days of the maintenance period as substitutes. By
contrast, there was evidence of the emergence of precautionary demand for liquidity early in
the maintenance period.
In order to illustrate this point, figure 3 shows the daily profile of bank’s current account
holdings with the ECB over two separate reserve maintenance periods: the period just before
the outbreak of the turmoil (spanning from 11 July to 7 August 2007) and the subsequent
maintenance period (from 8 August to 11 September 2007). As the figure shows, over the
period preceding the outbreak, banks’ aggregate current account holdings tended to remain
stable at levels close to the average level of reserve requirements for the period. Deviations
from this level remained in most days within a rather narrow range, in line with the typical
pattern for liquidity conditions observed in previous maintenance periods. 
By contrast, at the beginning of the reserve maintenance period starting on 8 July, ag-
gregate current holdings rose well above the average level of reserve requirements as a re-
sult of strong precautionary demand for central bank liquidity. Because of the averaging
mechanism used for the calculation of reserve holdings, this was followed during the sec-
ond part of the maintenance period by a decline in current holdings to levels significantly
below the reserve requirement level. Over the following maintenance periods, a similar pat-
tern –i.e. large surplus deposits (relative those needed for reserve requirement purposes) at
the start of the maintenance period followed by substantial shortfalls towards its end– be-
came recurrent.
As mentioned earlier, the shift in the time pattern for liquidity demand was related not
only to the fact that counterparties were reluctant to lend to each other on unsecured terms,
but also to their fear of being confronted with unexpected liquidity shocks. As a conse-
quence, banks seemed to prefer reducing their “liquidity gaps”, also by fulfilling their re-
serve requirements relatively early in the maintenance period.
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with the martingale hypothesis, prompting the ECB to bring its supply of liquidity forward
in the maintenance period (the so-called “frontloading”) in order to achieve the same level
of short-term interest rates as before. Concretely, the ECB accommodated banks’ preference
for the front-loading of reserves by systematically allotting more than the so-called “bench-
mark” amount in its weekly main refinancing operations. The allotments above the bench-
mark were reduced in the course of the maintenance period so that the average supply of liq-
uidity over the entire maintenance period remained unchanged9.
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Figure 3. Aggregate banks’ current account holdings with the ECB at selected 
reserve maintenance periods
Source: ECB.In the same vein, the ECB increased the amount of refinancing provided via longer-term
refinancing operations, with the objective of reducing the liquidity gaps of the banking sys-
tem and smoothing conditions in the term money market. It correspondingly reduced the
amounts allotted at the weekly main refinancing operations so that the total amount of out-
standing liquidity supply remained unchanged.
Indeed, during the early phases of the turmoil, the Eurosystem aimed at keeping the
overall level of euro refinancing provided to the banking sector at levels close to those pre-
vailing just before the turmoil, in line with its longstanding policy of providing the bank-
ing system only with the amount of liquidity needed to smoothly fulfil its aggregate liq-
uidity  deficit  over  each  maintenance  period.  The  Eurosystem’s  intermediation  role  in
support  of  the  affected  segments  of  the  euro  money  market  was,  therefore,  mainly
achieved by adjusting the modalities of the liquidity provision operations, given the level
of liquidity supply.
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September last year, the financial mar-
ket turmoil entered a more intense and disruptive phase, in which the money market be-
came, to a large extent, dysfunctional. In response to the deterioration of market condi-
tions, the Eurosystem expanded its temporary intermediation activity to ensure that the
dysfunctions of the money market did not drive solvent banks out of business10. Out of the
various measures implemented, perhaps the most important was the switch to fixed-rate
tender procedures with full allotment in all refinancing operations –not only euro credit
operations with maturities of one week up to six months, but also the ECB’s US dollar op-
erations with maturities from one week to three months– against a temporarily enlarged
set of collateral.
In practice, these measures imply that the ECB’s counterparties –which represent a very
large number of euro area credit institutions– can borrow as much euro and US dollar liq-
uidity as they wish, both at the weekly and at some key term maturities, against a larger than
usual set of eligible assets. As a result, the amount of euro refinancing provided by the Eu-
rosystem  in  collateralised  dollar  operations  in  euro  and  US  dollar  is  currently  close  to
€700 billion (after having reached a peak of around €900 billion at the end of last year), com-
pared with €450 billion before the start of the crisis.
Figure 4 illustrates the importance of the shift over the last two years in the maturity
composition of the ECB’s refinancing operations. In the summer of 2007, just before the out-
break of the turmoil, the ECB typically provided about 2/3 of its euro liquidity via the main
refinancing operations, with the rest via operations with a three-month maturity. Towards the
end of May 2009, the relative importance of the operations was almost inverted and MROs
accounted for just over 1/3 of total euro liquidity, with the rest supplied via operations at
one-, three- and six-months. On 7 May 2009 the ECB also announced that, as part of a pack-
age of measures designed to enhance its credit support policies, it would introduce refinanc-
ing operations with a twelve-month maturity. The first of such operations, launched in June,
met very strong demand (€442 billion).
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The Eurosystem has moved from the situation before the start of the turmoil, in which
it did not provide more refinancing to the banking system than was needed to satisfy the
aggregate liquidity needs arising from autonomous factors and reserve requirements, to
the present situation in which it effectively intermediates liquidity flows among individ-
ual banks. Therefore, the clearing of intrabank liquidity flows has, to a large extent,
moved from the dysfunctional money market to the Eurosystem’s balance sheet. Reflect-
ing the increased role played in financial intermediation, the Eurosystem’s consolidated
balance sheet (weekly financial statement) has increased by over 50% since the start of
the turmoil11.
Taking up a significant intermediation role to guarantee the orderly functioning of the
euro area economy was necessary in the wake of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in order
to address an unprecedented deterioration in the degree of public confidence in the banking
sectors of most developed economies, which seemed to undermine the ability of banks to
perform their institutional financial intermediation task. This was particularly important in
the case of the euro area since its economy is still predominantly “bank-based”, despite sig-
nificant changes in the area’s financial landscape in recent decades (as a result of a number
of structural developments, including the introduction of the euro). In 2007 aggregate bank
lending to the private sector amounted to 145% of GDP in the euro area, compared with 63%
in the US (see Table 1). By contrast, the value of outstanding debt securities issued by the
euro area private sector was equivalent to 81% of GDP, compared with more than twice as
much in the US.
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Figure 4. Maturity composition of the ECB liquidity operations
Source: ECB.Table 1
PRIVATE SECTOR CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE EURO AREA AND THE US
Euro area United States
1998 2007 1998 2007
(percentage of GDP)
capital market related to the private sector 200% 311% 300% 375%
of which:
quoted shares issued  63% 85% 145% 144%
debt securities issued by the private sector 45% 81% 107% 168%
bank loans to the private sector 92% 145% 49% 63%
Sources: BIS, DataStream, Eurostat, IMF, World Federation of Exchanges and ECB calculations.
Note: The size of the capital market is defined as the sum of stock market capitalisation (quoted shares issued),
bank loans granted to the private sector and debt securities issued by the private sector.
4.1.3. Extending facilities to non-banks 
Indeed, financial intermediation in the euro area has traditionally been, to a large extent,
conducted via the banking system, rather than via capital markets (unlike in the United States
and other Anglo-Saxon countries). The difference in relative importance of the banking sys-
tems and capital markets explains, to a large extent, why, in the course of the current crisis,
the Eurosystem’s efforts have focused on providing support to traditional banks, while other
central banks, such as the Fed, have also extended their support to other financial institu-
tions. The ECB’s working assumption in designing its policy response to the crisis was that
dysfunctions of the banking system have a relatively larger potential to cause disruptions to
the economy in the euro area than in other regions of the world.
Since the inception of the euro, the Eurosystem’s operational framework has granted ac-
cess to the Eurosystem’s credit operations to a very large number of counterparties12,both
via the marginal lending facility and the open market operations. Counterparty eligibility cri-
teria have been defined in general terms so that a wide range of depository institutions, in-
cluding small saving banks and co-operative banks, have direct access to central bank liq-
uidity. The combination of a large list of counterparties and a similarly wide range of assets
eligible as collateral (recently expanded further on a temporary basis), has proven very use-
ful during the turbulence, since it has allowed the Eurosystem to reach a very large number
of financial intermediaries at a time when short-term interbank markets are not functioning
properly.
In May 2009 the Eurosystem announced plans to strengthen its efforts to support credit ex-
pansion  by  purchasing  euro-denominated  banks’  covered  bonds  issued  in  the  euro  area
amounting to a value of €60 bn. This non-conventional measure was introduced with the ob-
jectives of improving market liquidity in important segments of the private debt security mar-
ket and to support credit expansion to the economy. At the same time, the porftolio of covered
bonds means to serve as a monetary policy instrument to achieve the price stability objective,
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icy when the severity of crisis requires the adoption of non-conventional measures. 
4.2. Monetary policy
4.2.1. Monetary policy under increased uncertainty 
The financial crisis has radically changed the environment of monetary policy-making.
The rises in oil and commodity prices that generated concerns about upside risks to price sta-
bility in recent years suddenly stopped in the course of 2008. The materialisation of down-
side risks to growth and the decline in inflationary pressures (largely due to falling commod-
ity prices and the effect of the deepening of the financial crisis and its spread to the real
economy) have led to a significant reduction in upside risks to price stability. 
Monetary policy-makers have had to adapt quickly to the current macroeconomic and
financial environment, which can be best characterised by the concept of non-measurable
risk, or “Knightian” uncertainty13. The very sharp increase in uncertainty that is typical of
periods of financial instability had immediate consequences on the risk premia that led to a
strong preference for safe and liquid assets with implications for the conduct of monetary
policy over the more recent period. 
Since the beginning of the financial turmoil in the summer of 2007, financial markets
have gone through a dramatic process of gradual revaluation and re-pricing of risk, not
only in the United States and the euro area, but also across the world. Following the bank-
ruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the deterioration of financial markets ac-
celerated. Investors’ loss of risk appetite, as well as the re-assessment of credit and liquid-
ity  risk,  has  been  reflected  in  significant  rises  in  credit  and  CDS  spreads.  This  is  a
phenomenon that has particularly affected firms with lower ratings (both in the financial
sector and in other sectors).
During this turbulent period, the transmission of policy rates to the money markets has
experienced substantial impairments. This is most evident from the strong increase in the
spread between the Euribor rates (indicative rates for unsecured lending among banks) and
the corresponding euro overnight index swap rates (Eonia swap rates), compared with the
levels prevailing before the turmoil (see figure 2). 
The transmission of monetary policy decisions to very short-term money markets is just
the first step along the transmission mechanism. Such decisions are subsequently passed
through to bank lending rates, which represent one of the key channels through which mon-
etary policy affects the economy. Reflecting contractual arrangements and banking prac-
tices, in many countries a variety of bank lending interest rates tend to adjust in line with the
three-month Euribor rather than the policy rate. This implies that the borrowing costs of
households and firms increased considerably before October 2008, also relative to the poli-
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ing the lowering of policy and money market rates which began in October 2008. Some signs
of easing conditions for risk premia in financial markets have also been observed in recent
months.
Looking, in particular, at the monetary policy reaction to the crisis, the size of the cu-
mulated interest rate reductions, especially since the coordinated interest-rate cut on 8 Octo-
ber 2008 by six major central banks (the ECB. the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England,
the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and the Swiss National Bank) has been exceptional
and has left the policy rates of most central banks at historically low levels.
4.2.2. Challenges for monetary policy making
This environment is not devoid of challenges for monetary policy. If a central bank
keeps cutting rates, sooner or later it will hit its lower bound. However, this alone should
not necessarily imply the end of monetary policy effectiveness, as other channels may re-
main  available  for  the  central  bank  to  additionally  stimulate  the  economy  in  order  to
achieve its monetary policy objective. The central bank, for instance, can change the size
and/or the composition of its balance sheet (two categories of unconventional measures
which are commonly referred to as “quantitative and qualitative easing”, respectively).
Through both these channels and specific commitment technologies, the central bank might
influence term and credit risk premia, and thus shape the yield curve and the cost of funds
to the private sector even when the short-term nominal interest rate is constrained by the
lower bound.
At the same time, unconventional measures entail non-trivial financial risks for the bal-
ance sheet of the central bank and their impact is subject to a high degree of uncertainty.
Thus, a precondition for more radical unconventional quantitative easing measures (e.g. the
large-scale purchase of government bonds by the central bank) seems to be that the standard
interest rate policy and what could be defined as more “conventional” quantitative easing
measures (e.g. the provision of support to the banking sector and the economy at large
through expanded liquidity provision and inclusive collateral policies) are deemed insuffi-
cient to ensure the credible anchoring of price stability. 
The outcome of the unconventional measures is likely to depend on sound communica-
tion with the public and on the existence of a clear, credible commitment of the central bank
with respect to achieving its monetary policy objective (a quantitative definition of price sta-
bility in the case of the ECB). The central bank must explain the reasons and the mechanism
through which these unconventional monetary policy channels operate in an environment of
zero or very low nominal interest rates. Given the importance of expectations for macroeco-
nomic developments, the central bank must also take the necessary actions to prevent the en-
trenchment of unacceptable deviations from its monetary policy objective in private sector
expectations.
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that go beyond the strict effectiveness of monetary policy. For example, the Japanese expe-
rience demonstrates that at very low nominal rates the interbank money markets are likely to
be disrupted and the stability of some financial institutions, such as money market funds,
may be jeopardised. While monetary policy could still be effective, an impaired money mar-
ket has serious consequences for the private financial intermediation and eventually poses
difficulties for the transmission of monetary policy and the optimal asset allocation within
the economy as well as risks to financial stability.
An additional challenge for central banks is the concern that the lower rates fall, the
more difficult it might become to reverse this policy, thus making it more likely that today’s
monetary policy may compromise future price stability and financial stability. 
4.2.3. International monetary policy coordination
It is worth stressing that the adjustment to the ECB policy rate began with a coordinat-
ed move with five other major central banks (the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the
Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and the Swiss National Bank) on October 2008. This
coordinated interest rate cut was unprecedented by historical standards and gave rise to the
question of whether the financial crisis may have ushered in a new era in which the global
nature of the challenges faced by central banks required increased international monetary
policy coordination.
The economic literature on policy coordination13 suggests that, under normal conditions,
the international integration of goods and services markets provides a relatively high degree of
risk pooling that makes mechanisms of formal policy coordination less necessary. This conclu-
sion is derived from the fact that rule-based policies are based on common principles and their
medium-term oriented nature implies that they anchor expectations and confidence so that the
symmetric stabilisation of domestic conditions brings about stable global conditions as well.
The financial crisis, however, has shown that, if not from policy coordination, there are
important benefits from cooperation in an increasingly integrated world economy, where ad-
verse shocks to one market are not confined by national borders but rather propagate glob-
ally at a rapid pace. Indeed, while a coordinated rate cut is by nature exceptional, coopera-
tion in different areas among world major central banks (particularly, liquidity provision and
information exchange) has proven to be an effective policy response to global and domestic
challenges, supporting confidence at times of heightened uncertainty.
4.2.4. Financial stability
The third front for central bank policy action is represented by the measures taken to pre-
serve financial stability. Contributing to financial stability in the euro area is one of the core
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maintaining price stability and by contributing to the smooth functioning of the money mar-
kets, the ECB prevents unnecessary volatility from being introduced into economic activity
and financial markets, thus providing an important contribution to safeguarding financial
stability in the euro area, particularly at times of crisis like the present.
In addition, central banks have actively participated in a wide range of international
committees and fora entrusted with the task of restoring market functioning and enhancing
the resilience of the financial system.
Priority has been given to restoring market confidence. In this context, initiatives de-
signed to strengthen transparency and valuation standards should be singled out as pivotal.
In particular, improvements were warranted in the disclosure standards for financial institu-
tions’ exposures to structured products as well as in the practices followed for their valua-
tion.  In  this  respect,  many  large  global  banks  have  consistently  applied  the  disclosure
methodology set out in the FSB report to their holdings of complex and illiquid instruments,
thus demonstrating the willingness of the private sector to contribute to strengthening mar-
ket confidence. Furthermore, guidance has been provided by the Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision on assessing banks’ fair value practices for financial instruments.
In the same vein, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has intensified
its work to enhance accounting and disclosure standards of off-balance sheet entities and re-
leased draft guidance on fair value measurement when markets become inactive. Central
banks as well as banking supervisors have contributed to this work by participating in the re-
lated expert advisory panel. Furthermore, a Financial Crisis Advisory Group whose primary
role is to advise the IASB and the US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) on the
standard-setting implications of the global financial crisis and the potential changes to the
global regulatory environment has been created.
While the aforementioned measures significantly improved the information available to
markets, investors and competent authorities, the failure of Lehman Brothers generated an
unprecedented deterioration in the degree of confidence in the banking sector, triggering the
coordinated action of governments. In this context, the European Heads of State adopted a
set of common principles aimed at addressing the financial turmoil and ensuring that the de-
sign of national stabilisation measures did not lead to negative spill-over effects across coun-
tries. The “EU common principles” endorsed at the European Council of 15-16 October laid
down the common features for granting guarantees on new issuance of bank debt and recap-
italisation measures adopted by the Member States.
The ECB contributed to this work by proposing recommendations encompassing the
provision of government guarantees for bank debt and recapitalisation measures. First, the
Governing Council of the ECB proposed a set of recommendations on the framework for
granting government guarantees, which identified the following main objectives for this
measure: i) addressing the funding problems of solvent banks; ii) safeguarding the level
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ing consistency with the operational framework of the Eurosystem to avoid impairing the
implementation of the single monetary policy. Furthermore, these recommendations includ-
ed a pricing system for the government guarantees on bank debt.
The EU governments agreed to provide guarantees for new medium-term bank senior
debt (up to five years) under a scheme to expire on 31 December 2009. Banks have begun to
make use of this measure. According to ECB (2009), at the end of May of 2009 the outstand-
ing volume of government guaranteed unsecured bank bonds amounted to €397 billion in the
euro area, and €544 billion in the EU. While more banks have indicated their intentions to
issue similar bonds, the volumes issued remain low relative to the amounts potentially com-
mitted by euro area and EU governments (€1,677 billion and €2,096 billion, respectively). 
Second, with regard to recapitalisation measures, the ECB also provided recommenda-
tions. The main aim of these measures has been to improve the functioning and stability of
the banking system and to foster an adequate flow of credit to the economy by providing Tier
I capital to fundamentally sound institutions. This would be carried out by acquiring equity
in the form of ordinary shares, preferred shares or other hybrid instruments, such as subor-
dinated debt. The total commitments regarding recapitalisation schemes reached €172 bil-
lion in the euro area and €247 billion in the EU at the end of May 2009, though also in this
case the take-up ratios are low15.
Also in this regard, the Governing Council of the ECB proposed a methodology for
benchmarking the pricing of State recapitalisation measures for fundamentally sound insti-
tutions in the euro area. These recommendations are, without prejudice to guidance from the
European Commission, aimed at avoiding undue distortions to competition in accordance
with the State aid rules of the Treaty.
The pricing system proposed by the Governing Council of the ECB considered that any
recapitalisation should take into consideration the specific market situation of each institu-
tion, distinguishing in particular between fundamentally sound and distressed banks. Based
on this premise, it provided for a required rate of return, captured by a “price corridor”,
which varies depending on the type of instrument. The lower band of this corridor is applied
to instruments with features similar to those of subordinated debt and the higher band to
those with features similar to ordinary shares. It is also recommended that the temporary na-
ture of recapitalisation measures should be ensured by providing financial institutions with
incentives to redeem such instruments and that the pricing system be revised periodically to
reflect possible changes in market conditions.
Overall, we can be fully confident that the actions taken by central banks and national
governments provide an appropriate response to the challenges raised by recent events. Still,
restoring market functioning and returning to normal market conditions ultimately depends
on the banking sector. In this context, reactivating the interbank market and ensuring the
proper financing of the economy is of the utmost importance.
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Looking forward, the current crisis is likely to bring important changes for the future of
the economic and financial systems. These include revisions to the regulatory and supervi-
sory domains, reforms of the international financial architecture as well as changes in the na-
ture of the relationships and coordination among the different policies and public authorities,
which are likely to bring a new environment for central banking. This gives rise to the fol-
lowing questions regarding the institutional framework in which central banks may operate. 
5.1. More international convergence in liquidity frameworks?
Since August 2007 central banks have responded in a variety of ways to the financial
market disruptions, reflecting differences in the extent to which markets have been hit by the
turbulences, and differences in the design of their operational frameworks. However, the
major central banks also showed a certain degree of convergence in their operating proce-
dures. In particular, central banks:
– Pursued more active reserve management, reassuring banks of their orderly access to
overnight funds and increasing the frequency of their operations.
– Increased the supply of funds (notably long-term); expanded to varying degrees the
definition of collateral accepted in collateralised lending operations; provided access
to collateralised lending to a large number of counterparties.
– Adapted tender procedures for open market operations in the direction of price rather
than quantity-based schemes, akin to those used for standing facilities.
– As the turbulence developed, central banks strengthened their cooperation through
enhanced communication and collective market monitoring and coordinated actions
to provide liquidity. In this respect, a significant number of swap lines between cen-
tral banks have been set up to facilitate the distribution of foreign currency liquidity
to domestic counterparties.
One lesson that can be drawn from the turmoil is that there are certain key operational
features that facilitate the implementation of monetary policy under stress. In particular, at
times of impaired interbank lending, central banks are better positioned to effectively distrib-
ute reserves if they are capable of providing access to collateralised lending operations on a
large scale to a wide set of counterparties and against a broad range of collateral.
Yet, a very important issue on which no clear answer can yet be provided is how much
this convergence in the understanding of the “optimal” features of the operational framework
under stress, should be reflected by the design of the operational framework in the steady
state. This requires, in particular, to develop a better understanding of the optimal mix be-
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visory bodies.
In this context, it should be noted that to the extent that differences in monetary policy
strategies, central banks’ status vis-à-vis governments, and certain specific features of do-
mestic financial systems persist, the optimal liquidity frameworks of each central bank
should continue to reflect such country- or area-specific factors.
5.2. More scope for direct lending to the real economy?
An additional issue that has come up to the fore in the current crisis concerns the extent
to which central banks may engage in direct lending to the real economy as the recent estab-
lishment by the Federal Reserve System of several liquidity facilities directed to non-banks
shows (for instance, those directed to money market funds and issuers of commercial paper).
In principle, the scope for direct lending by the central bank to the real economy
should depend on the extent that the malfunctioning of the money and credit markets dis-
torts bank lending and prevents aggregate households and businesses from obtaining cred-
it. In that sense, some central banks have decided to bypass the banking system and start
lending to households and firms directly for the sake of preserving the orderly functioning
of the economy.
In practice, even abstracting from possible institutional or legal constraints (e.g. the pro-
hibition of monetary financing to the state in the European Monetary Union), there are sev-
eral issues that central banks must consider before deciding on the appropriateness for their
“own” economies of providing direct financing to the real sectors. Whether or not a central
bank engages in direct lending will very much depend on a number of considerations refer-
ring to structural features of the economy, the gravity of the crisis, the state of the financial
system and a number of institutional factors, notably those governing the relationship be-
tween the central bank and the government.
For instance, one apparently straightforward observation is that the need to provide di-
rect credit to the economy at times of dysfunctions in banking activity is likely to depend
on the relative importance of the banking sector for financial intermediation. Following
this argument, one may argue that in a bank-based economy there may be relatively less
need to provide credit to agents other than banks than in a market-based economy. Indeed,
by focusing on providing support to the banking sector, the central bank may increase its
chances of sustaining the economy as a whole. However, under extreme circumstances
(notably, when the banking sector is no longer able to fulfil its institutional tasks as the
main engine of financial intermediation), a central bank may reach the opposite conclu-
sion: exactly because of the banking sector’s predominance in financial intermediation, its
dysfunctional state might prompt a central bank to intervene before the entire economy
comes to a halt.
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need for the central bank to take decisions on the optimal allocation of resources in the econ-
omy which, historical experience shows, are better left to the private sector.
Other concerns may relate to the risk of political pressure and government interference,
especially if the scale of the financing programme requires support from the Treasury. If fi-
nancing is ensured through the expansion of the central bank’s liabilities, this may give rise
to more general concerns about the fiscal costs of actions taken by the monetary authority16.
Finally, but related to the previous arguments, direct lending to the real economy may imply
an increase in the financial risks taken by the central bank, potential exposing the latter to
risks to its financial independence and, ultimately, to its institutional independence.
Based on these considerations, the Eurosystem has chosen to indirectly provide support
to the economy (i.e. using the banking sector as an intermediary sector) by making full use
of the possibilities provided by its operational framework. In particular, by providing banks
with unlimited access at fixed rates to its refinancing operations and by accepting a wide
range of private paper as collateral, the Eurosystem has aimed to effectively support the pro-
vision of credit to the real economy. More recently, the Eurosystem has announced plans to
purchase euro-denominated covered bonds issued in the euro area to provide further support
to credit provision by the banking sector.
5.3. More domestic policy coordination?
Policy responses both at the global and the European level have been characterised by
an increasing degree of coordination. A natural question, therefore, seems to be whether,
looking forward, greater policy coordination at the level of the EU/euro area should be war-
ranted. Given the existence of the single currency in the euro area, the focus will be first on
the coordination among national fiscal policies. In the euro area the Stability and Growth
Pact provides a coordination device for fiscal policies, particularly through peer pressure
mechanisms that encourage sound and sustainable public finances. 
On the fiscal side, a key challenge for the future is to prevent the financial crisis from
eventually undermining the sustainability and credibility of public finances. An additional
challenge is that EU countries are already facing considerable long-term challenges from the
costs associated with population ageing that should be borne in mind when considering
short-term demand policies. If the starting position is less strong, an inappropriate short-term
response may make a country “age faster” by exposing even more strongly the need for ad-
justments to cope with the long-term challenges. Countries with large deficit and/or debt lev-
els may be particularly vulnerable in this regard.
Unfortunately, many euro area countries entered the financial crisis and the economic
downturn with relatively weak fiscal balances, having missed the opportunity presented by
past years’ revenue windfalls to consolidate their budgets. Indeed, in the past decade coun-
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good times as evidence of structural improvements, which were often used to motivate
spending increases or tax cuts. On a more positive note, it can be said that while compliance
with the Stability and Growth Pact during its first ten years has been somewhat uneven, the
EU’s overall fiscal performance in terms of avoiding high budget deficits and the build-up
of government debt was much better than in the decades preceding the Pact17. 
One additional dimension of policy coordination in the euro area is that between the sin-
gle monetary policy and the national fiscal policies of the Member States. In this respect, the
institutional set-up of European Monetary Union consists of a clear and efficient assignment
of objectives and instruments to the different authorities, together with a strict division of re-
sponsibilities. The ECB must focus on its primary mandate of delivering medium-term price
stability under conditions of full independence. Fiscal policy must focus on its traditional ob-
jectives related to allocation, redistribution and stabilisation (to varying extents), while con-
tributing to maintaining an environment of macroeconomic stability.
Of course, in setting monetary policy the ECB takes into account the fiscal policy stance,
as one of the factors which contribute to the outlook for price stability over the medium term.
The ECB has repeatedly acknowledged that an open exchange of views and information
among the different authorities is welcome if it enhances a common understanding of desir-
able objectives and strategies to pursue them. However, it is reluctant to engage into active
ex ante coordination of fiscal and monetary policies out of concerns that this may blur the
responsibilities of the various authorities involved at the expense of accountability, ultimate-
ly reducing their incentives to pursue their objectives. Thus, the current macroeconomic pol-
icy framework in the euro area based on a separation of responsibilities will continue to be
seen as the most appropriate to ensure sustained and non-inflationary economic growth.
5.4. More international monetary policy coordination?
While cooperation in the field of liquidity management on an unprecedented scale has
been certainly one of the hallmarks of public responses to the current turmoil, another exam-
ple without precedents of central bank coordination was the decision by the ECB and five
other major central banks to ease global monetary conditions on 8 October 2008. Commen-
tators and observers have wondered whether this concerted policy decision may be the be-
ginning of a new era of increased international monetary policy coordination in response to
economic and financial globalisation.
It is important to notice that this coordinated interest rate cut was taken in a specific
context and with a specific objective. There was extraordinary uncertainty at the time about
the economic outlook and strong evidence that upside risks to price stability had diminished
at the global level. The coordinated cut addressed the need to respond to a common shock
that was being transmitted around the globe almost simultaneously. Through the joint com-
munication, the international central banking community intended to provide a signal of its
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ket turmoil.
There is no doubt that over the past three decades the trade, economic and financial link-
ages among the different regions of the work have grown tighter, and of course policy-makers
take this into account in the design of their policies. However, when talking about internation-
al policy coordination, it is important to define clearly what it is meant. Indeed, differences in
cyclical positions, structures of the economies (e.g. in terms of market rigidities and frictions,
sectoral leverage, financial systems, etc.), monetary policy institutional frameworks as well as
shocks hitting the economy almost necessarily lead to differences in deciding the appropriate
monetary policy stance. Thus, systematic monetary policy coordination may eventually come
at the cost of weakening a central bank’s commitment to its institutional objective.
Thus, for central banks international policy coordination is better understood as the con-
tinuous cooperation and exchange of information at both staff and decision-making levels,
shared  experienced  and  mutual  understanding,  which  very  much  lies  on  the  consensus
among central banks that monetary policies geared towards domestic price stability, sound
public finances and flexible economic structures do create the conditions for long-term eco-
nomic growth and financial stability.
5.5. More weight given to asset prices in monetary policy?
Another interesting debate that has gained renewed interest and strength over the past
year is the role that asset prices should take in the monetary policy design. Indeed, as the
present experience shows, large volatility in asset prices can jeopardise the stability of the fi-
nancial system and potentially undermine macroeconomic stability. The repetition of boom-
bust cycles and the potentially very high costs for macroeconomic stability associated with
the typically abrupt reversal of the excessive valuation of assets beg the question of whether
monetary policy should give more weight to asset prices.
It is often argued that bubbles are extremely difficult to identify in real time. Given that
the assessment of whether or not asset prices are being driven by fundamentals is surrounded
with uncertainty –perhaps even sometimes uncertainty in the “Knigthian” sense– central banks
should refrain from targeting asset prices. Moreover, while monetary policy actions can influ-
ence asset price developments, the magnitude of the swings in policy rates that would be need-
ed to curb boom and bust cycles in asset prices could have adverse implications for macroeco-
nomic stability in the short term. Based on these arguments, one view is that central banks
should refrain from intervening until the bubble bursts and then ease monetary policy aggres-
sively to provide support to the banking system and the economy (the so-called “mop up after”
approach). The downside of this strategy is of course that it may risk creating moral hazard. 
An alternative approach consists of “leaning against the wind”. According to this ap-
proach, the central bank should conduct a slightly tighter monetary policy than warranted by
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is identified. By doing so, the central bank would buy insurance against the risk of a harm-
ful asset boom-bust cycle, with its potential costs in terms of macroeconomic and financial
stability.
The main argument against this approach is that the premium stemming from such a pol-
icy framework may be excessively high. In fact, a policy response to asset price increases
may end up destabilising the economy if the asset price revaluation is driven by fundamen-
tals. This risk is related to the difficulty concerning the identification of asset price misalign-
ments in real time. However, several empirical studies have recently shown that it is possi-
ble  to  define  early  indicators  based  on  money  and  credit  variables  that  can  assist  the
policy-maker in assessing the nature and the consequences of the reverse phase18 of extraor-
dinary asset price developments, thereby providing reliable information about the opportu-
nity of policy action.
Overall, the very high costs of the current financial crisis seem to provide support to the
case for a flexible “leaning against the wind” strategy. How can one implement such a pol-
icy in practice? The ECB has long argued that its two-pillar monetary policy strategy is well
suited to cope with the challenges brought about by asset price developments19. There is a
close link between monetary and credit developments and evolving imbalances in asset and
credit markets. By exploiting this link, the ECB’s monetary analysis (consisting of a com-
prehensive assessment of the liquidity situation) may provide early information on develop-
ing asset price imbalances and, therefore, allow for a timely response to the implied risks to
price and financial stability. More in general, including relevant money and credit indicators
in the information set of the monetary policy makers may represent a practical way of mim-
icking the “leaning against the wind” approach.
5.6. More central bank involvement in supervision?
The recent financial market crisis has also highlighted the important role that central
banks play in safeguarding financial stability and the need to increase interaction between
central banks and banking supervisors. This need for increased interaction, also identified by
the FSB in one of its recommendations, would further support and enhance the central
banks’ role in financial stability assessments, crisis management and resolution, and liquid-
ity provision.
First, with regard to financial stability assessment: central banks can benefit from ex-
tended access to supervisory information especially in relation to systemically relevant insti-
tutions, in order to identify risks and vulnerabilities for the financial system as a whole in a
more efficient way. In this context, the FSB and the IMF are already intensifying their co-
operation with a view to enhancing the assessment of financial stability risks on a global
scale, while in the EU the same is valid for the Banking Supervision Committee and the
Committee of European Banking Supervisors. These efforts should also be mirrored at the
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information between central banks and supervisory authorities for an overall better monitor-
ing and assessment of risks to the financial system. The other side of this coin relates to the
issue of incorporating the outcome of the financial stability risk analysis into policy action
in the field of supervision, which also needs to be reinforced.
Second, in the area of crisis management and resolution: the global nature of financial
markets and the increased interlinkages between markets and institutions requires competent
financial authorities, central banks, supervisors and ministries of finance to strengthen their
coordination mechanisms for the management of crisis involving cross-border financial in-
stitutions. In the EU, an important milestone has been reached with the Memorandum of Un-
derstanding (MoU) signed by the competent authorities of all Member States in June 2008.
This MoU establishes common principles, procedures and terminology to be used by all par-
ties involved in a cross-border crisis.
Third, in relation to liquidity provision: in order to maintain stable money markets, cen-
tral banks would benefit from enhanced access to supervisory information, including liquid-
ity stress-testing and contingency funding plans of banks. At the same time, supervisors
would benefit from information available at central banks, such as banks’ bidding behaviour.
Overall, while the need for enhanced interaction between central banks and supervisory
authorities is widely acknowledged, recent events have called into question whether im-
proved interaction in cooperation suffices. In this context, the debate has recently turned to-
wards the future supervisory architecture. The financial crisis has underscored the urgency
of reviewing the EU supervisory framework, which is still based on national responsibilities
against the background of increased financial market integration and the growing role of
large cross-border financial institutions. 
In  the  EU,  a  High  Level  Group  set  up  under  the  chairmanship  of  Mr  Jacques  de
Larosiére with the mandate to examine the allocation of tasks between the national and the
European level and submit proposals to strengthen European supervisory arrangements is-
sued its recommendations in February 2009. These recommendations that envisage, among
others, a leading role of central banks and the ECB in particular in financial supervision,
have been reflected in the recent proposal by the European Commission to set up a new Eu-
ropean Systemic Risk Board in charge of macro-prudential supervision in the European
Union.
6. Concluding remarks
The financial turmoil, which began in the summer of 2007, has developed over time into
one of the most disruptive crises that the world has experienced in many decades. This is
why from the start of the turmoil public authorities –both in the euro area and in other parts
of the world– have implemented a large range of measures in key fields, including liquidity
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ing financial stability and destabilising the economic systems. In addition, many initiatives
have been undertaken to address weaknesses in the regulatory and supervisory framework in
order to provide sounder foundations to financial systems. 
Indeed, from the beginning of the crisis, a key concern has been to understand how dis-
turbances stemming from a relatively small segment of the market presumably linked to
local and regional conditions (such as the US sub-prime mortgage market) could spread
through continents and markets at such a rapid pace, undermining the strength of economies
and financial systems and, ultimately, giving rise to concerns about systemic stability. There
is increasing consensus that at the root of the crisis, we can find a combination of macroeco-
nomic imbalances and microeconomic factors, including market failures and deficiencies in
the design of regulatory and supervisory frameworks, which are being addressed in order to
make the international financial system more resilient. Specifically, in the case of Europe
there is increasing concern that the current prudential framework based on national regula-
tory and supervisory regimes cannot address the many challenges arising from the activities
of large, complex and highly interdependent financial institutions operating across borders. 
The need to strengthen the role of central banks in preserving financial stability has also
become the focus of the policy debate as efforts are made to address the causes of the crisis.
The current crisis is likely to bring important changes for the future of the economic and fi-
nancial systems in which we live. These include changes in the nature of the relationship and
degree of coordination among the different policies and public authorities, revisions to the
regulatory and supervisory domains as well as reforms of the international financial archi-
tecture. Therefore, we are likely to witness a number of institutional changes that will bring
about a new environment for policy-making in a number of areas related to central banking.
Notes
1. See Cassola et al. (2008), Cecchetti (2009) and CGFS (2008) for further details. The effects of asymmetric in-
formation and counterparty credit risk on the structure of the interbank market and various policy responses
are analysed in Heider et al. (2008).
2. See ECB(2008b).
3. See Ashcraft and Schuermann, (2008), Rajan (2005) and Sufi and Mian (2008).
4. See Kashyap et al. (2008).
5. See CGFS (2008) for an account.
6. In addition to the ECB, the Fed provides US dollar liquidity to the central banks of Australia, Brasil, Canada,
Denmark, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK.
7. For illustration, one may adapt the Poole (1970) paradigm to liquidity management during a financial turmoil:
when the demand for liquidity becomes unstable (different demand pattern), the central bank focuses on sta-
bilising interest rates directly, rather than stabilising interest rates by managing the quantity (“excess” allot-
ments above benchmark).
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9. In order to keep the average supply of liquidity over the entire maintenance period unchanged the ECB con-
ducted liquidity-absorbing fine-tuning operations on the last day of the maintenance period.
10. See Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) for an analysis of how protracted funding and market liquidity may lead
to solvent institutions becoming unable to continue operating.
11. From €1,546 billion at end-July 2007 to €2,400 billion at end-May 2009.
12. Currently, around 2,100 credit institutions are eligible for the Eurosystem’s open market operations, almost
2,300 credit institutions can access the Eurosystem’s marginal lending facility.
13. The notion of Knightian uncertainty refers to the distinction, introduced by the economist Frank Knight, be-
tween “risks” (to which probabilities can be assigned) and “uncertainty” (for which even these probabilities
are unknown).
14. See, among others, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002), Oudiz and Sachs (1984) and Trichet (2008).
15. There were also capital injections outside government recapitalisation schemes amounting to over €50 billion,
which dealt with troubled institutions such as Fortis and Dexia.
16. See Cukierman (2006).
17. See ECB (2008a).
18. Alessi L. and C. Detken (2009).
19. See also ECB (2005) and Trichet (2005).
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Resumen
Las tensiones financieras que comenzaron en el verano de 2007 han terminado dando lugar a una de
las crisis económicas y financieras más severas experimentadas a nivel mundial desde hace muchas dé-
155 Financial market failures and public policies: A central banker’s perspective on the global financial crisiscadas. En la raíz de la crisis se encuentra una combinación de desequilibrios macroeconómicos y de
factores macroeconómicos, que incluyen fallos del mercado y deficiencias en el diseño de los marcos
de regulación y supervisión. Este artículo analiza las causas subyacentes que han contribuido a la cri-
sis, y valora las principales medidas adoptadas por bancos centrales y gobiernos para mitigar sus efec-
tos, así como las principales enseñanzas para hacer más resistentes los mercados financieros interna-
cionales.
Palabras clave: fallos del mercado, crisis financiera, políticas públicas, BCE.
Clasificación JEL: E58, E61, E65, G28.
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